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RECENT CASES
BAILMENTS-Presumptions and Burden of Proof-There
has been considerable discussion of the Kelly v. Capitol Motors,
Inc.' case in South Carolina, particularly in connection with
the burden of proof and presumptions arising in bailment
cases. The rule in South Carolina as established in the leading
case of Fleischman, Morris & Co. v. Southern Ry.2 is, ".... that
the bailor must prove delivery to the bailee and his refusal to
return as required by the contract of bailment. The burden
is then on the bailee to prove that he has not converted the
property, and this he may do by showing its loss and the
manner of its loss; but by the manner of loss is meant not
only the isolated fact of destructiofi by fire, or loss by theft
or otherwise, but the circumstances connected with the origin
of the fire or other cause of loss or injury as far as known
to the bailee and the precautions taken to prevent the loss
or injury."
This rule has been refined and followed in South Caro-
lina. The immediately previous case of Gilland v. Peter's Dry
Cleaning Co.3 held that where the plaintiff introduced evi-
dence showing the delivery of a coat to the defendant in good
condition and that it was subsequently returned in a discol-
ored condition, a prima facie case had been established; and
if the defendant wishes to contend that he had used due care,
evidence to that effect should have been offered, and that the
magistrate's judgment for the plaintiff was proper. .
In the present case, 4 it appeared that the appellant oper-
ated an automobile sales and repairs garage on the lower floor
of a two-story building, the top floor being occupied by a
bowling alley. A fire started in the bowling alley which con-
sumed the entire building. Therespondent's car, which had
been delivered to the appellant for repairs, was destroyed
along with several others which could not be removed. In the
trial court at the close of all the testimony, the appellant
1. 204 S. C. 304, 28 S. E. (2d) 836 (1944).
2. 76-S. C. 237, 56 S. E. 974, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 519 (1906).
3. 195 S. C. 417, 11 S. E. (2d) 857 (1940).
4. See Note 1, supra.
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made a motion for a directed verdict. This motion was re-
fused and the jury gave judgment- for the plaintiff. In the
Supreme Court, the findings of the lower court were re-
versed and judgment entered for the appellant. The Supreme
Court adopted and based their decision on the following two
considerations: (1) "The record must warrant a reasonable
inference of negligence upon the part of the bailee." The
court decided, here, that no inference existed other than that
due care had been exercised on the part of the bailee, and
that the trial Judge committed a reversible error in refusing
to direct a verdict for the defendant. (2) "The record must
warrant a reasonable finding that such negligence upon the
part of the bailee was a proximate, direct and immediate
cause of the loss or damage." This, it would seem, would
provide- much sounder basis for making a decision in this
case. See the very noteworthy opinion of Mr. Associate
Stukes, dissenting.
Even if we may disagree with the conclusions as found in
the present case, it would appear that a definite effort was
made to apply the rule as established in the leading case of
Fleischman, Morris & Co. v. Southern .Ry., supra, and pre-
scribed in Gilland v. Peters Dry Cleaning Co., supra.
It has been said that the principles embraced in the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur apply in South Carolina, in spite
of the many statements of South Carolina courts that the
doctrine, in name, does not apply. It is beyond the scope
and intention of this case note to present anything like a
complete discussion of this issue, even if limited to bailnient
cases. The following comments are made with respect to the
rule in bailment cases as set out above.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be invoked, in al-
most all jurisdictions where the circumstances proved point
merely to the physical cause of the occurrence, without having
any tendency to indicate some fault of omission or commis-
sion on the part of the defendant. The doctrine is applicable
to the fact of negligence only in order to make out a prima
facie case of negligence. The Tes ipsa loquitur rule has been
said to be a qualification rather than an exception to the gen-
eral rule of evidence that negligence must be affirmatively
proved in that it relates to the mode, rather than the burden,
of establishing negligence. The circumstances must indicate
superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation on the
291
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party charged. The fact or circumstance accompanying an
injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least
permit an inference, of negligence on the part of the defend-
ant. What is this presumption arising under the doctrine?
In most jurisdiction the presumption is a mere equipoise in
evidence, which takes the place of evidence as affecting the
burden of proceeding with the case. The doctrine does not
have the effect of shifting the burden of proof, in that all
the defendant need do is produce exculpating evidence of
equal weight. While many cases seem to indicate that the
burden of proof does shift, nevertheless, upon close examina-
tion it is discovered that this is not the actual holding of these
cases, but rather, a loose and unguarded use of the term
"burden of proof". It should be noted that the plaintiff must
assume the burden of establishing negligence by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. If a satisfactory explanation is of-
fered by the defendant, the plaintiff must rebut it by evidence
of negligence or lose his pase.5
In Corpus Juris Secundum 6 the following statement is
given with respect to bailment cases: "The rule adopted in
other and the more modern decisions is that proof of loss or
injury establishes a sufficient prima facie case against the
bailee to put him on his defense; and hence, where chattels
are delivered to a bailee in good condition 'and are returned
in damaged state, or are lost or not returned at all, the law
presumes the bailee's negligence or other fault to be the cause,
and cast on the bailee the burden of showing that the loss
was due to -other causes consistent with due care on his part,
this rule being regarded as an application of the principal
of res ipsa loquitur and if the bailee does not sustain such bur-
den the bailor becomes entitled as a matter of law to a verdict
in his favor." To support this there is cited the South Carolina
case of Marlow v. Conway IRon Works.7 This case merely re-
iterates the South Carolina bailment rule as set forth above.
It would seem that the South Carolina rule on bailment
cases employs the res ipsa loquitur principle or one at least
closely analogous. In South Carolina, the bailor must prove
delivery of goods and that they were either not returned or
B. 38 A. J. 1007.
6. 8 C. J. S. 342.
7. 130 S. C. 956, .125 S. E. 569 (1923).
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returned in a damaged condition. The bailor has then estab-
lished a prima facie case and it becomes the duty of the
bailee to go forward with the evidence. After such a prim
facie case is made however, if the bailee goes forward with
the evidence which remains uncontradicted, from which evi-
dence no inference can reasonably be drawn other than that
he had exercised due care, a motion for a directed verdict
in favor of the defendant is properly granted. Although the
presumption of negligence, said to exist in res ipsa. loquitur
cases, does not exist under the South Carolina rule, the results
are achieved identically in theory and application. It was
pointed out in Wardlaw v. Soutk Carolina R. Co. (1858)8 that
the omission to prove what a party should at all times be
prepared to establish may well raise a presumption against
him. It should be apparent that the principles of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine have been employed in the South Carolina
rule in bailment cases unless we wish to be linguistically
naive.
RALPH BAILEY, JR.
8. 11 Rich. Law 337, 45 S. C. Law 337 (1858).
NEGLIGENCE -Application of the Doctrine of "Last
Clear Chance" in South Carolina.-The recent case of Scott
v. Greenville Pharmacy Inc., stirs again the dubious position
of the South Carolina Courts on the applicability of the Last
Clear Chance Doctrine. Previous to the decision of this case;
the Supreme Court of South Carolina had made but two men-
tions of this doctrine. In the celebrated case of Spillers v.
Griffin,2 the court in sustaining the defendant's exception to
the trial court's charge ruled: "His Honor charged that, even
though the plaintiff was negligent, yet if the defendant's
servant saw the plaintiff in time to avoid the collision, the
plaintiff might still recover. That is the doctrine of the 'last
clear chance', and is not the law in this state." The only other
1. Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, Inc., 212 S. C. 485, 48 S. E. (2d)
324 (1948).
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mention of this doctrine was in. the case of Blackwell v.
First National Bank of Columbia8 in which the Court adopted
and reaffirmed the above quoted section from the case of
Spillers v. Griffin, supra.
The court in the principal case, without overruling the
case of Spillers v. Griffin, supra, invoked expressly the doc-
trine of the Last Clear Chance to the aid of the defendant,
and adopted the principle as stated in Restatement, Torts,
Sec. 480 (1934) :
"A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable
vigilance could have observed the danger created by the
defendant's negligence in time to have avoided harnr
therefrom, may recover if but only if, the defendant (a)
knew of the plaintiff's situation, and (b) realized or
had reason to realize that the plaintiff was inattentive
and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time to
avoid the harm, and (c) thereafter is negligent in fail-
ing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his
then existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff".
The plaintiff's intestate in the principal case brought her
action under S. C. Code, Section 411, (1942), as wife of the
deceased to recover for his wrongful death. The complaint
alleged that the deceased in the latter part of 1945, suffering
from a cold which later developed into flu, sought from the
defendant some drug which would "ease his nervousness and
.promote sleep." In response to his request he was sold
barbiturate capsules in a box container, without a label of
any kind, and such was sold without a doctor's prescription
as is required by S. C. Code, Section 5128-25 (1942). It
was further alleged that such sales were made to the de-
ceased periodically thereafter under the same conditions for
a period of about a year preceding his death. It was alleged
that the barbiturate preparation in question is a habit form-
ing drug; that deceased was not advised of its nature, and-
that as a result of his taking the capsules he became habitu-
ated to the use of the drug, in consequence of which he dete-
riorated mentally and physically to such an extent that while-
under thie influence of the drug he committed suicide. The de-
3. Blackwell v. First National Bank of Columbia, 185 S. C. 427, 194
S. E. 339 (1937').
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fendant's demurrer to the complaint was sustained, the court
pointing out that on the face of the complaint the plaintiff
has averred showing contributory negligence in that before
he became an addict, he continued in his purchases of the
drug. The court after describing the Last Clear Chance Doc-
trine as "sound law", denied the application to the benefit of
plaintiff in that there was no allegation that the plaintiff was
no longer a free agent incapable of controlling his own
conduct.
As authority for the principles embodied in the Last Clear
Chance Doctrine, the court cites the case of Seay v. Southern
Railway-Carolina Division.4 The court did not deny the plain-
tiff his recovery despite his own negligence and stated the
rule thusly:
" * * * when the negligence of the person inflicting
the injury is subsequent to and independent of the care-
lessness of the person injured, and ordinary care on the
part of the person inflicting the injury would have dis-
covered the carelessness of the person injured in time
to avoid its effect and prevent injuring him, there is
no contributory negligence, because the fault of the in-
jured party becomes remote in the chain of causation.
In such case the want of ordinary care on the part of
the injured person is held not a judicial cause (i.e., a
proximate cause) of his injury, but oxly a condition of
its occurrence."
It is of note that in the case of Seay v. Southern Railway-
Carolina Division, supra, no mention is made of the Last Clear
Chance Doctrine although the principles set out in that case
are analogous to that doctrine. The case turned on the well
recognized rule of contributory negligence that in order for
the negligence of the plaintiff to bar his recovery, his neg-
ligence must be a or the proximate cause of the injury.
To the same effect is the case of Fletcher v. South Caro-
lina & G. E. R. Co.,5 in which the court approved the following
charge to the jury:
4. Seay v. Southern Railway-Carolina Division, 205 S. C. 162, 31
S. E. (2nd) 133 (1943).
5. Fletcher v. South Carolina & G. E. R. Co., 57 S. C. 205, 35 S. E.
513 (1900).
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"That should the jury believe that Clark Ely, the
driver of the wagon, was negligent in driving upon the
railroad track without having used proper efforts to dis-
cern the approach of the train, yet if the engineer of
the train did see him in a position of peril and danger, or
could have seen him by the exercise of due diligence, it
was the duty of said engineer to use reasonable and prac-
ticable means to stop the train or prevent injury; and if
he failed to do so, and from such failure the injury oc-
curred, the defendant would be liable."
This too was explained by the proximate cause theory.
In the old case of Colin v. City Council of Charleston,6 the
court had this to say:
"That where one has himself contributed to the cause
of the damage of which he complains he cannot recover
against another who also contributed to the same cause."
This was however qualified by the following remark:
4* * but this may be understood of the proximate and
not any remote or collateral cause."
There seems to be no dispute among the text writers that
the old English case of Davies v. Mann7 pioneered the doc-
trine of the Last Clear Chance, yet it would appear that it
merely defined the law of contributory negligence. The court
in that case granted relief to the plaintiff for the loss of his
donkey caused by the defendant's negligence in driving his
team of horses into the donkey, notwithstanding the plain-
tiff's negligence in leaving the poor animal fettered in the
highway, the court saying,
" * * * the mere fact of negligence on the part of the
plaintiff in leaving his donkey on the public highway,
was no answer to the action, unless the donkey's being
there was the immediate cause of the injury; and that
if it was caused by the fault of the defendant's servant
in driving too fast, or which is the same thing at a
6. Colin v. City Council of Charleston, 15 Rich. Law 201 (S. C. 1868).
7. Davies v. Mann, 10 M & W 546, 152 English Reprints 588, 17
Eng. Rul. Cas. 190 (1842).
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smartish pace, the mere fact of putting the ass upon
the road would not bar the plaintiff of his action".
It is interesting to note that despite the fact that South
Carolina in the case of Spillers v. Griffin, supra, has expressly
repudiated the Last Clear Chance Doctrine, it has in the case
of Gunter v. Graniteville Manufacturing Co.,8 also cited with
approval the pioneering Davies v. Mann, supra.
As to the applicability of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine
in this country, the various states may be divided into three
categories, viz., (1) those states that apply the doctrine but
declare it to be merely an application of the proximate cause
theory,9 (2) those states that apply the doctrine and declare
it to be a distinct and separate principle of law, allowing
recovery despite contributory negligence, 0 and (3) those
states that repudiate the doctrine altogether.
South Carolina, it would seem by the decision in the case
of Spillers v. Grifn, supra, is placed in the third category;
but from exhaustive research of the authorities in this State,
and from the indorsement of tbe Last Clear Chance Doctrine
in the principal case, it appears that South Carolina has
-placed herself along with the states adopting what would
seem to be the most logical view, i.e., that the doctrine is
recognized, but that it is merely an application of the prox-
:imate cause theory.
L. H. MENGEDOHT
8. Gunter v. Graniteville Manufacturing Co., 15 S. C. 443, .. S. E.
(1881).
9. See Smith v. Norfolk & S. R. Co., 114 N. C. 728, 19 S. E. 863,
25 L.R.A. 287 (1894).
10. See West v. Gillette, 95 Ohio St. 305, 116 N. E. 521 (1917).
11. See Bushman v. Calumet & S. C. R. Co., 214 Ill. App. 435 (1919).
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